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Abstract 
Across three studies, we examined the role of self-evaluation in predicting conspiracy 
beliefs. Previous research linked the endorsement of conspiracy theories to low self-esteem. 
We propose that conspiracy theories should rather be appealing to individuals with 
exaggerated feelings of self-love, such as narcissists, due to their paranoid tendencies. In 
Study 1 general conspiracist beliefs were predicted by high individual narcissism but low 
self-esteem. Study 2 demonstrated that these effects were differentially mediated by paranoid 
thoughts, and independent of the effects of collective narcissism. Individual narcissism 
predicted generalized conspiracist beliefs, regardless of the conspiracy theories implicating 
in-group or out-group members, while collective narcissism predicted belief in out-group but 
not in-group conspiracies. Study 3 replicated the effects of individual narcissism and self-
esteem on the endorsement of various specific conspiracy theories and demonstrated that the 
negative effect of self-esteem was largely accounted for by the general negativity towards 
humans associated with low self-esteem.  
Keywords: conspiracy theories, self-esteem, narcissism, collective narcissism, paranoia 
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Does self-love or self-hate predict conspiracy beliefs?  
Narcissism, self-esteem and the endorsement of conspiracy theories 
Although conspiracy theories are often treated as harmless entertainment, they can 
have serious societal consequences (Douglas, Sutton, Jolley, & Wood, 2015). For example, 
exposure to conspiracy theories can decrease political engagement or pro-environmental 
behavior (Jolley & Douglas, 2014a; 2014b). If widespread conspiracy theories affect the 
society, then it seems important to understand psychological factors underlying conspiracy 
beliefs. One prevalent hypothesis in this line of inquiry has been that conspiracy theories are 
usually endorsed by individuals who show poor psychological adjustment or are in some way 
socially disadvantaged. Conspiracy beliefs have been linked to powerlessness (Abalakina-
Paap, Stephan, Craig, & Gregory, 1999), feelings of relative deprivation (Bilewicz, 
Winiewski, Kofta, & Wójcik, 2013), anomie (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Imhoff & Bruder, 
2014), lack of personal control (Whitson & Galinsky, 2008; cf. Bruder, Haffke, Neave, 
Nouripanah, & Imhoff, 2013), uncertainty (van Prooijen & Jostmann, 2012; Whitson, 
Galinsky, & Kay, 2015), and being a member of a disadvantaged group (Abalkina-Paap et al., 
1999; Crocker, Luhtanen, Broadnax, & Blaine, 1999; Goertzel, 1994). It has been theorized 
that belief in others´ conspiratorial actions that unfairly undermine one’s own efforts, can 
serve to protect feelings of self-worth (Robins & Post, 1997). 
In line with this reasoning, Abalkina-Paap and colleagues (1999) proposed that 
conspiracy beliefs should be endorsed by people with low self-esteem “because this permits 
them to blame others for their problems” (p. 644). So far, however, evidence linking 
conspiracy beliefs to low self-esteem remains inconsistent. Low self-esteem was only a 
marginally significant predictor of various conspiracy beliefs in the study by Abalkina-Paap 
and colleagues (1999). In other studies, low self-esteem significantly predicted endorsement 
of some conspiracy theories (e.g., concerning the London bombings of July 7, 2005, Swami 
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et al., 2011; see also Swami & Furnham, 2012) but not others (e.g., concerning conspiratorial 
actions of Jews, Swami, 2012; see also Crocker et al., 1999; Stieger, Gumhalter, Tran, 
Voracek, & Swami, 2013). Similarly, general conspiracist ideation was negatively correlated 
with self-esteem in a study by Stieger and colleagues (2013; although the correlation was 
significant only in the first wave of measurement) but this relationship was weaker and non-
significant in a study by Swami (2012).  
We suggest that linking conspiracy beliefs to low self-esteem could have been 
premature. There are in fact reasons to believe that the endorsement of conspiracy theories 
might be more strongly associated with excessively positive view of the self. Convictions 
about others’ malevolent intentions have been linked to individual narcissism, which is 
characterised by a pattern of grandiosity accompanied by the need for external validation 
(Freud, 1914/2012; Fromm, 1964/2010; Raskin & Terry, 1988; Robins & Post, 1997; Wulff, 
1987). Narcissists tend to believe they are unique and special compared to other people 
(Reynolds & Lejuez, 2011) but, at the same time, they are excessively preoccupied with how 
others see them (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Horvath & Morf, 2009). Research shows that 
such heightened self-reference and awareness of others’ perceptions can foster paranoia—a 
tendency to perceive others’ actions as intentionally malicious (Feningsten & Vanable, 1992; 
see Cameron, 1959; Cicero & Kerns, 2011; Raskin & Terry, 1988). Paranoia has been 
identified as a robust predictor of conspiracy beliefs, which correspond to a more specific 
conviction that a major political or social event is intentionally caused by “a secret plot by a 
covert alliance of powerful individuals or organizations” (Douglas & Suttton, 2011, p. 3; e.g., 
Bruder et al., 2013; Darwin, Neale, & Holmes, 2011; Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; Kramer & 
Schaffer, 2014; Wilson & Rose, 2014). Melley (2002) suggested that it is the intentionality 
bias that makes the paranoid prone to perceive significant events as being caused by 
conspiracies. By integrating these perspectives, we predict that narcissists should be 
RUNNING HEAD: Narcissism and conspiracy beliefs                                                   5 
 
   
especially likely to endorse conspiracy theories, as due to their sensitivity to others’ 
perceptions they show paranoid tendencies. 
Importantly, the propositions that conspiracy beliefs are related to low self-esteem and 
to high individual narcissism are not necessarily contradictory. In fact, one reason for the 
inconsistent link between self-esteem and conspiracy beliefs, revealed by previous studies, 
could be that typical measures of self-esteem do not distinguish between self-evaluation that 
is narcissistic versus secure (i.e., without the defensive component captured by narcissism; 
Horney, 1939; Kernis, 2003; Paulhus, Robins, Trzesniewski, & Tracy, 2004). Narcissistic and 
secure self-esteem overlap in favourable self-evaluation but when they are considered in the 
same regression analysis, we can observe their unique effects (Paulhus et al., 2004). For 
example, previous research demonstrated that low self-esteem becomes a predictor of 
antisocial behaviour only when the variance it shares with individual narcissism is accounted 
for. Moreover, when both variables are considered, the effects of narcissism on antisocial 
behaviour tend to significantly strengthen (Locke, 2009; Paulhus et al., 2004). Such a pattern 
of results indicates a suppression effect, in which inclusion of a suppressor variable in the 
analyses “increases the predictive validity of another variable” (Conger, 1974, pp. 36–37; 
MacKinnon, Krull, & Lockwood, 2000). Therefore, to fully examine the link between 
conspiracy beliefs and self-evaluation, both narcissism and self-esteem should be considered. 
Overview 
The aim of the current research is to shed light on the role of individual narcissism 
and self-esteem in predicting conspiracy beliefs. In three studies we test the hypothesis that 
when the overlap between self-esteem and individual narcissism is controlled for, conspiracy 
beliefs will be predicted by high individual narcissism and low self-esteem. We also examine 
whether the effects of individual narcissism versus self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs are 
mediated by paranoid ideation (Study 2) or whether they can be accounted for by a general 
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negativity towards humans (Study 3). In addition, given that conspiracy theories often 
presume an intergroup dimension (Kofta & Sędek, 2005; van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014), 
in Study 2 we examine whether the effects differ depending on the conspiracy theories 
involving in-group or out-group members. In all studies, we report how we determined our 
sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures. 
Study 1 
In Study 1 we tested the hypothesis that conspiracy beliefs would be predicted by high 
individual narcissism but low self-esteem. We expected self-esteem and individual narcissism 
to work as mutual suppressors in predicting conspiracy beliefs—considering both aspects of 
self-evaluation together should strengthen their initial relationships with conspiracy beliefs.   
Method 
Participants and procedure. We aimed to collect data from at least 200 Mturk 
workers. For consistency, we asked only for workers located in the US. The survey was 
completed by 202 participants
1
, 74 women, 128 men, aged 18-72 (M=31.27, SD=10.46). 
Most participants reported having a university degree (n=124) and White (non-Hispanic) as 
their ethnicity (n=152)
2
. Participants filled out measures of self-esteem, individual narcissism 
and conspiracy beliefs presented (counterbalanced). 
Measures. 
                                                          
1
 In all studies, only completed surveys were analyzed. Study 1 included an attention check. 
Excluding data from 13 participants who failed it did not affect the results.  
2
 None of the demographic variables was associated with conspiracy beliefs in Study 1. In 
Studies 2 and 3 ethnic minorities endorsed conspiracy theories more strongly than Whites. 
Unless stated otherwise, the pattern of results remained similar when we adjusted for 
demographics (age, gender, ethnicity, education in Studies 1 and 2; age, gender, ethnicity in 
Study 3) in the regression analyses.  
RUNNING HEAD: Narcissism and conspiracy beliefs                                                   7 
 
   
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with the 15 item Generic Conspiracist Beliefs 
Scale (Brotherton, French, & Pickering, 2013). Participants were asked to what extent they 
agree with statements such as “New and advanced technology which would harm current 
industry is being suppressed.” on a scale from 1=definitely not true to 5=definitely true, 
α=.93, M=2.66, SD=0.86. 
Self-esteem was measured with Rosenberg’s (1965) self-esteem scale. Participants 
responded to 10 items on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree, α=.93, 
M=3.82, SD=0.89. 
Individual narcissism was measured with a simplified version (Ang & Yusof, 2006) 
of the 40-item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (Emmons, 1987; Raskin & Hall, 1979). 
Participants rated to what extent statements representing narcissistic traits described them on 
a scale from 1=not at all like me to 5=very much like me, α=.96, M=2.79, SD=0.70. 
Results 
Zero-order correlations. Individual narcissism was significantly positively 
correlated with self-esteem, r(200)=.41[.27, .53]
3
, p<.001, and conspiracy beliefs, 
r(200)=.24[.10, .38], p<.001. The correlation between conspiracy beliefs and self-esteem was 
non-significant, r(200)= -.08[-.22, .07], p=.29. 
Self-esteem and individual narcissism as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. In order 
to test the suppression hypothesis, we included self-esteem and individual narcissism together 
as predictors of conspiracy beliefs in a regression model. When the overlap between 
individual narcissism and self-esteem was adjusted for, the effect of narcissism on conspiracy 
beliefs remained positive and significant, B=0.41[0.23, 0.57], SE=0.09, β=.33, p<.001, while 
                                                          
3
 Across all manuscript, square brackets include 95% bootstrapped bias-corrected confidence 
intervals (10,000 resamples). 
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the effect of self-esteem became significantly negative, B= -0.20 [-0.34, -0.06], SE=0.07, β= -
.21, p=.01; F(2, 199)=10.55, p<.001, R
2
=.10.  
We then tested whether the inclusion of narcissism in the regression model increased 
the predictive validity of self-esteem resulting in a suppression effect. We used Mplus7 
(Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). Program defaults were used for the estimator and treatment 
of missing data (the same settings were used for all path analyses). Bootstrapping analysis 
confirmed a significant suppressing effect of narcissism, standardized estimate=.13 [0.06, 
0.21], p<.001, indicating that the effect of self-esteem strengthened when narcissism was 
included in the model. We also tested whether inclusion of self-esteem in the model increased 
the predictive validity of narcissism. Bootstrapping analysis confirmed a significant 
suppressing effect of self-esteem, standardized estimate= -.09[-.15, -.02], p=.01, indicating 
that the positive effect of narcissism strengthened when self-esteem was included in the 
model (Figure 1). 
 
 Figure 1. Individual narcissism and self-esteem predicting conspiracy beliefs across all 
studies. Solid lines indicate standardized regression coefficients. Dashed lines indicate 
bivariate correlations. S1= Study 1, S2 = Study 2, S3 = Study 3. 
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Conspiracy 
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S1= .41*** 
S2 = .28*** 
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S
1
= -.08, S
2
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3
 = .01  
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1
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2
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3
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2
 = -.12+, S
3
 = -.09*  
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+
 p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01.*** p < .001. 
Discussion 
The results of Study 1 provide initial support for our hypothesis that adjusting for the 
overlap between self-esteem and individual narcissism reveals the opposite relationships 
these variables have with belief in conspiracy theories. When the variance shared between 
these variables was accounted for, the negative relationship between self-esteem and 
conspiracy beliefs became significant, while the positive relationship between individual 
narcissism and conspiracy beliefs strengthened. Thus, only with individual narcissism 
partialled out did low self-esteem predict conspiracy beliefs.  
Study 2 
In Study 2 we examined whether the effects of high individual narcissism and low 
self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs are mediated by paranoid thought. We expected high 
individual narcissism and low self-esteem to be associated with paranoia which should 
further foster conspiracist ideation. Moreover, because conspiracy theories often refer to 
malevolent actions of groups (e.g., Kofta & Sędek, 2005), we wanted to distinguish whether 
it is a narcissistic image of the self or the group that predicts the endorsement of conspiracy 
theories. Previous research has linked conspiracy beliefs to collective narcissism—belief in-
group’s greatness associated with a conviction that others do not appreciate the in-group 
enough (Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, Eidelson, & Jayawickreme, 2009).  
Collective narcissism seems to foster beliefs in conspiratorial intentions of out-group 
members. For example, Polish national collective narcissism predicted the endorsement of 
conspiracy stereotypes of Jews (Golec de Zavala & Cichocka, 2012). Similarly, American 
collective narcissism predicted the endorsement of conspiracy theories involving foreign 
governments but not the American government (Cichocka, Golec de Zavala, Marchlewska, & 
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Olechowski, 2015). Presumably, due to their high concern with the in-group image, collective 
narcissists are less likely to endorse conspiracy theories involving members of their in-group. 
Because individual and collective narcissism tend to be positively correlated (Golec 
de Zavala et al., 2009; Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Iskra-Golec, 2013), in Study 2 we 
sought to demonstrate the unique effect of individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs over 
and above collective narcissism. Moreover, because individual narcissists should be less 
concerned with the in-group image, we expected individual narcissism to predict 
endorsement of conspiracy theories regardless of these theories implicating members of in-
groups or out-groups. 
Method 
Participants and procedure. We aimed to collect data from at least 275 Mturk 
workers located in the US. The survey was completed by 276 participants. Because Study 2 
examined effects for beliefs of intergroup conspiracies, we excluded data from participants 
who reported the nationality they most identify with as other than American or mixed 
American (n=7). The final sample included 269 participants, 144 women, 124 men (1 
unknown), aged 18-79 (M=32.81, SD=12.54), 161 with a university degree, 196 White (non-
Hispanic). 
First, participants completed measures of individual and collective narcissism and 
self-esteem (counterbalanced)
4
. Afterwards, they completed a paranoid thought scale. Finally, 
they were randomly assigned to complete one of two versions of the conspiracy beliefs scale. 
In the in-group version (n=140) they were asked to think about the American government and 
answer questions about belief in the government’s conspiratorial actions. In the out-group 
                                                          
4
 Study 2 included a single item measure of inclusion of the in-group in the self (Tropp & 
Wright, 2001). When we included this measure as a covariate in the regression analyses, the 
pattern of results remained similar.  
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version (n=129) they were asked to think about foreign governments and answer a similar set 
of questions but in relation to conspiratorial actions of foreign governments (see 
Supplement).  
Measures. 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with 11 items based on the Generic Conspiracist 
Beliefs Scale (Brotherton et al., 2013) used in Study 1. Participants first read instructions 
indicating that they will rate statements in relation to the American government or foreign 
governments on a scale from 1=definitely not true to 5=definitely true. Items were chosen 
based on whether they could apply to own versus foreign governments, e.g., “Foreign 
governments [the American government] use[s] people as patsies to hide involvement in 
criminal activity”, α=.91, M=2.95, SD=0.85. 
Self-esteem was measured with the single-item self-esteem measure (Robins, Hendin, 
& Trzesniewski, 2001). Participants indicated whether the statement “I have high self-
esteem” applies to them on a scale from 1=not very true of me to 7=very true of me, M=4.50, 
SD=1.78.  
Individual narcissism was measured as in Study 1, α=.95, M=2.77, SD=0.69. 
Collective narcissism was measured with the 5-item Collective Narcissism Scale 
(Golec de Zavala, Cichocka, & Bilewicz, 2013). Participants responded to items measuring 
their sentiments towards their national group (e.g., “Americans deserve special treatment”) on 
a scale from 1=definitely disagree to 6=definitely agree, α=.88, M=2.58, SD=1.17. 
Paranoid thought was measured with the 20-item Paranoia Scale (Fenigstein & 
Vanable, 1992). Participants were asked to respond to each item (e.g., “Someone has it in for 
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me”) on a scale from 1=not at all applicable to me to 5=extremely applicable to me, α=.92, 
M=2.35, SD=0.76.    
Results 
Zero-order correlations. Self-esteem and the two forms of narcissism were all 
significantly positively correlated (Table 1). Conspiracy beliefs were significantly positively 
correlated with individual and collective narcissism (p=.04) and paranoid thought, and 
positively although not-significantly (p=.47) correlated with self-esteem. Paranoid thought 
was significantly positively correlated with individual narcissism (p=.004), significantly 
negatively with self-esteem, and marginally positively with collective narcissism (p=.08).  
Table 1 
Zero-order Correlations [and 95% Confidence Intervals] between Continuous Variables 
(Study 2) 
Measure 1 2 3 4 
1. Self-esteem  
2. Individual narcissism 
 
3. Collective narcissism 
- 
.53*** 
[.42, .63] 
.22*** 
[.08, .35] 
 
- 
 
.35*** 
[.24, .46] 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
4. Paranoid thought -.30** 
[-.41, -.18] 
.18*** 
[.05, .30] 
.11
+ 
[-.02, .23] 
- 
5. Conspiracy beliefs .05 
[-.08, .17] 
.25*** 
[.12, .37] 
.13* 
[-.003, .25] 
.37*** 
[.27, .47] 
+
 p < .10. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Self-esteem and individual narcissism as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. We 
examined self-esteem and individual narcissism as predictors of conspiracy beliefs by 
including both of them in the regression analysis as predictors, adjusting for the content of 
conspiracies (coded -1=own, 1=foreign government[s]). The model was significant, F(3, 
263)=7.48, p<.001, R
2
=.08. When the overlap between individual narcissism and self-esteem 
was adjusted for, individual narcissism remained a positive predictor of conspiracy beliefs, 
B=0.35[0.18, 0.53], SE=0.09, β=.29, p<.001, while self-esteem became a negative, 
marginally significant, predictor of conspiracy beliefs, B= -0.06[-0.12, 0.01], SE=0.03, β= -
.12, p=.09
5
. Bootstrapping analysis in MPlus7 confirmed a significant suppression effects via 
individual narcissism, standardized estimate=.16[.08, .24], p<.001, indicating that the effect 
of self-esteem strengthened when individual narcissism was included in the model. The 
indirect effect via self-esteem was marginally significant, standardized estimate= -.06[-0.14, 
0.01], p=.08, indicating that although the positive effect of individual narcissism on 
conspiracy beliefs remained significant it did not strengthen significantly when self-esteem 
was included in the model. The pattern of results remained similar when we adjusted for 
collective narcissism.  
We then examined whether these opposing relationships would be differentially 
mediated via paranoid thought. In MPlus7 we tested a path model with self-esteem and 
individual narcissism as predictors (both included in the model command), conspiracy beliefs 
as the outcome, paranoid thought as a mediator, and condition as a covariate (Figure 2). 
                                                          
5
 When we included demographics as covariates the negative effect for self-esteem became 
significant, B= -0.07, SE=0.04, β= -.16, p=.04. 
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Figure 2. Indirect effect of individual narcissism and self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs via 
paranoid thought (Study 2). Entries are standardized coefficients. Dotted lines indicate direct 
effects. Paths for the covariate (scale version) are not presented in the model for simplicity. 
+
 p < .10. *** p < .001. 
Individual narcissism was a significant positive predictor of paranoia, B=0.51[0.38, 
0.65], SE=0.07, β=.47, p<.001, which was in turn a positive predictor of conspiracy beliefs, 
B=0.42[0.28, 0.56], SE=0.07, β=.37, p<.001. Moreover, when paranoia was included as a 
mediator, the positive effect of individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs became weaker 
and marginally significant, B=0.15[-0.03, 0.33], SE=0.09, β=.12, p=.09. The indirect effect of 
individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs via paranoia was significant, with the 
standardized estimate=.17[.10, .25], p<.001.   
Self-esteem was a significant negative predictor of paranoia, B= -0.24[-0.29, -0.19], 
SE=0.03, β= -.56, p<.001. When paranoia was included as a mediator, the effect of self-
esteem on conspiracy beliefs became positive and non-significant, B=0.05[-0.02, 0.12], 
SE=0.04, β=.10, p=.20. The indirect effect of self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs via paranoia 
was significant and negative, with the standardized estimate= -0.21[-0.29, -0.13], p<.001. The 
Paranoid 
thought  
0.47***  
 
-0.56*** 
 
Narcissism 
Self-esteem 
Conspiracy 
beliefs  
.10 
  .37*** .54***  
.12+ 
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indirect effects were not conditional on the content of conspiracy theories and remained 
significant when we adjusted for collective narcissism.  
Tests of alternative models revealed a significant, yet smaller, indirect effect of 
individual narcissism on paranoia via conspiracy beliefs, standardized estimate=.09[.04, .14], 
p=.001, and a non-significant effect of self-esteem on paranoia via conspiracy beliefs= -.03[-
.07, .01], p=.10. Both the effects of paranoia on conspiracy beliefs via narcissism=.02[-.01, 
.05], p=.17, and via self-esteem= -.03[-.08, .02], p=.22, were non-significant. 
Individual and collective narcissism as predictors of in-group versus out-group 
conspiracy beliefs. Finally, we checked whether the effects of collective and individual 
narcissism, as well as self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs were dependent on the conspiracy 
content. In a regression analysis we included the conspiracy content, collective narcissism, 
individual narcissism and self-esteem, and three two-way interactions of conspiracy content 
with the continuous predictors. The whole model was significant, F(7, 259)=4.31, p<.001, 
R
2
=.10. Conspiracy content moderated only the effects of collective narcissism on conspiracy 
beliefs, B=0.11[0.01, 0.20], SE=0.05, β=.15, p=.02. Simple slopes analysis indicated that 
collective narcissism was positively associated with conspiracy beliefs in the out-group 
conspiracies condition, B=0.16[0.01, 0.30], SE=0.07, β=.22, p=.03, and negatively, but not 
significantly, in the in-group conspiracies condition, B= -0.06[-0.19, 0.07], SE=0.06, β= -
0.09, p=.30. The interactions between individual narcissism and conspiracy content, B= -
0.11[-0.30, 0.09], SE=0.09, β= -.09, p=.23, and between self-esteem and conspiracy content, 
B= -0.02[-0.08, 0.04], SE=0.03, β= -.04, p=.54, were non-significant6. When we adjusted for 
paranoid thought, the pattern of results remained the same. We also tested whether the effect 
                                                          
6
 When individual interactions are included in the model, the interaction of collective 
narcissism and content is marginally significant, B=0.08, SE=0.04, β=.11, p=.07, while the 
other two interactions remain non-significant, both βs= -.06, ps>.33. 
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of collective narcissism on conspiracy beliefs was mediated by paranoid thought but this 
effect was non-significant and was not conditional on the content of conspiracies.  
Discussion 
Study 2 corroborated the results of Study 1 by demonstrating that individual 
narcissism suppresses the link between self-esteem and conspiracy beliefs. Self-esteem alone 
was not significantly correlated with conspiracy beliefs, but it became a marginally 
significant negative predictor of conspiracy beliefs when its overlap with individual 
narcissism was adjusted for. Individual narcissism was significantly positively correlated with 
conspiracy beliefs and this effect remained significant when we adjusted for self-esteem. 
Study 2 also demonstrated that paranoid thought was associated with high individual 
narcissism but low self-esteem. Moreover, paranoid thought differentially mediated the 
relationship between conspiracy beliefs and these two types of self-evaluation and these 
effects were larger than those of competing indirect effects models. 
Finally, Study 2 revealed that individual narcissism predicted conspiracy beliefs even 
when adjusting for its overlap with collective narcissism. The effect of individual narcissism 
on the endorsement of conspiracy theories was not moderated by whether these theories 
involved own versus foreign governments, while collective narcissism significantly predicted 
only the endorsement of conspiracy theories about foreign governments (replicating previous 
research; Cichocka et al., 2015).   
Study 3 
As in Study 1, in Study 2 individual narcissism was a significant predictor of 
conspiracy belief. However, in Study 2 the negative effect of self-esteem on conspiracy 
beliefs was weaker than in Study 1 and only marginally significant. We therefore sought to 
RUNNING HEAD: Narcissism and conspiracy beliefs                                                   17 
 
   
replicate the suppression effect with the use of a larger sample of at least 500 participants, 
which should allow for detecting even small indirect effects with the use of bias-corrected 
bootstrapping (assuming power of .80; Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). Moreover, we tested the 
robustness of our findings by implementing a different measure of conspiracy beliefs. While 
in Studies 1 and 2 we measured generic conspiracist ideation (Brotherton et al., 2013), in 
Study 3 we asked participants about specific conspiracy theories (Douglas, Sutton, Callan, 
Dawtry, & Harvey, in press). Finally, we examined whether the effects of narcissism and 
self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs can be accounted for by generalized negative opinions 
about people (see Abalkina-Paap et al., 1999; Douglas & Stutton, 2011)
7
. Hence, we included 
a measure of humanity esteem (Luke & Maio, 2009), which captures “a general favorable or 
unfavorable evaluation of humanity” (p. 592).  
Method 
Participants and procedure. We aimed to collect data from 510 Mturk workers 
located in the US. The survey was completed by 516 participants, 310 women, 206 men, aged 
18-75 (M=35.32, SD=13.10), 387 White (non-Hispanic). Participants filled out measures of 
self-esteem, individual narcissism, conspiracy beliefs and humanity esteem 
(counterbalanced).
8
 
Measures. 
Conspiracy beliefs were measured with a 7-item Conspiracist Beliefs Scale (Douglas 
et al., in press). Participants were asked to what extent they agree with a series of statements 
about well-known conspiracy theories, e.g., “The American moon landings were faked.” on a 
scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree, α=.82, M=2.47, SD=1.20. 
                                                          
7
 We are grateful to an anonymous Reviewer for this suggestion. 
8
 Study 3 also included measures of ideology and prejudice for purposes of a different 
project. 
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Self-esteem was measured as in Study 1, α=.93, M=3.79, SD=0.92. 
Individual narcissism was measured with the Narcissistic Personality Inventory 
(Raskin & Hall, 1979). Participants were presented with 40 pairs of diagnostic and non-
diagnostic items and were asked to choose the ones that describe them best, α=.88, M=.30, 
SD=.19. 
Humanity esteem was measured with the 10-item Humanity-Esteem Scale (e.g., “I 
take a positive attitude toward humanity”; Luke & Maio, 2009). Participants indicated to 
what extent they agree with the statements on a scale from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly 
agree, α=.88, M=5.17, SD=1.07. 
Results 
Zero-order correlations. Self-esteem was significantly positively correlated with 
individual narcissism and humanity esteem. Humanity esteem was unrelated to narcissism, 
p=.68. Conspiracy beliefs were significantly positively correlated with individual narcissism 
and not significantly with self-esteem, p=.78. Conspiracy beliefs were significantly 
negatively correlated with humanity esteem (Table 2).  
Table 2 
Zero-order Correlations [and 95% Confidence Intervals] between Continuous Variables 
(Study 3) 
 1 2 3 
1. Self-esteem  -   
2. Individual narcissism .28*** -  
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[.20, .36] 
3. Humanity esteem .47*** 
[.39, .54] 
-.02 
[-.11, .08] 
- 
4. Conspiracy beliefs .01 
[-.07, .09] 
.33*** 
[.25, .40] 
-.18*** 
[-.26, -.10] 
*** p < .001. 
Self-esteem and individual narcissism as predictors of conspiracy beliefs. We first 
tested for a suppression effect. When the overlap between individual narcissism and self-
esteem was adjusted for, the effect of individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs remained 
positive and significant, B=2.24[1.68, 2.84], SE=0.28, β=.35, p<.001, while the effect of self-
esteem became significantly negative, B= -0.11[-0.22, -0.01], SE=0.06, β= -.09, p=.049; F(2, 
513)=32.78, p<.001, R
2
=.11. Bootstrapping analysis confirmed a significant suppressing 
effect of individual narcissism, standardized estimate=.10[0.06, 0.13], p<.001, indicating that 
the effect of self-esteem strengthened when narcissism was included in the model. 
Bootstrapping analysis also confirmed a significant suppressing effect of self-esteem, 
standardized estimate= -.02[-0.05, -0.001], p=.045, indicating that the positive effect of 
narcissism strengthened when self-esteem was included in the model.  
We then examined whether these opposing relationships are accounted for by 
humanity esteem by testing a path model in Mplus7 with self-esteem and individual 
narcissism as predictors (included in the model command), conspiracy beliefs as the outcome, 
and examining the indirect effect of humanity esteem. Individual narcissism was a significant 
negative predictor of humanity esteem, B= -0.92[-1.41, -0.46], SE=0.24, β= -.16, p<.001, 
which was a negative predictor of conspiracy beliefs, B= -0.20[-0.31, -0.09], SE=0.06, β= -
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.18, p<.001. When humanity esteem was included in the model, the effect of individual 
narcissism on conspiracy beliefs remained significant, B=2.06[1.47, 2.63], SE=0.30, β=.32, p 
< .001 and the indirect effect of individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs via humanity 
esteem was significant, standardized estimate=.03[.01, .05], p=.01.   
Self-esteem was a significant positive predictor of humanity esteem, B=0.60[0.50, 
0.69], SE=0.05, β=.51, p<.001. When humanity esteem was included in the model, the effect 
of self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs became non-significant, B=0.01[-0.12, 0.13], SE=0.06, 
β=.004, p=.93. The indirect effect of self-esteem on conspiracy beliefs via paranoid thought 
was significant and negative, standardized estimate= -0.09[-0.14, -0.04], p<.001.  
Tests of alternative models revealed a significant indirect effect of individual 
narcissism on humanity esteem via conspiracy beliefs= -.05[-.09, -.02], p=.001 and a 
marginally significant effect of self-esteem on humanity esteem via conspiracy beliefs=.01[-
.001, .03], p=.07. Both the effects of humanity esteem on conspiracy beliefs via narcissism= -
.01[-.04, .02], p=.71, and via self-esteem=.002[-.04, .05], p=.93, were non-significant. 
Discussion 
In Study 3 self-esteem and individual narcissism acted as mutual suppressors in 
predicting conspiracy beliefs. When we adjusted for their overlap, the positive effect of 
narcissism strengthened, and the non-significant effect of self-esteem became significantly 
negative. Moreover, when we accounted for the effects of humanity esteem, the effect of 
narcissism on conspiracy decreased slightly but remained significant, while the effect of self-
esteem became non-significant and close to zero. This suggests that the effect of low self-
esteem on conspiracy beliefs can be largely attributed to the fact that low self-esteem predicts 
negative perceptions of humanity more broadly. 
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General Discussion 
Results of three studies demonstrated that the endorsement of conspiracy theories is 
positively associated with individual narcissism. Individual narcissism was a robust predictor 
of general conspiracy ideation (Studies 1 and 2) as well as of beliefs in several specific 
conspiracy theories (Study 3). In Study 2 individual narcissism predicted the endorsement of 
conspiracy theories regardless of these theories implicating in-group or out-group members. 
This effect remained significant even when we accounted for collective narcissism—another 
variable frequently linked to the endorsement of conspiracy theories (Cichocka et al., 2015). 
Moreover, Study 3 demonstrated that individual narcissism remained a significant predictor 
of conspiracy beliefs when we accounted for general negativity towards humanity. We 
suggest that individual narcissists might be especially prone to believe in conspiracy theories 
due to their elevated self-consciousness connected with exaggerated feelings of being in the 
centre of others’ attention (Emmons, 1987; Tracy & Robins, 2004) and perceiving others’ 
behaviour as intentionally targeted against them (Fenigstein & Vanable, 1992). Such 
perceptions are linked to higher degrees of paranoid thoughts which, in turn, foster proneness 
for conspiracy beliefs (Grzesiak-Feldman, 2015; Kramer, 1998). Indeed, Study 2 
demonstrated that the effect of individual narcissism on conspiracy beliefs was driven by 
paranoid thought.  
In all studies self-esteem alone was not significantly correlated with belief in 
conspiracy theories. Nevertheless, when the overlap between individual narcissism and self-
esteem was accounted for, self-esteem became a significant or marginally significant negative 
predictor of conspiracy beliefs. This suggests that conspiracy beliefs are negatively associated 
with secure self-esteem (i.e., self-evaluation without the narcissistic component; Paulhus et 
al., 2004). However, across all studies this effect was weaker than that of narcissism and 
became close to zero once we accounted for the relationship between low self-esteem and 
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negativity towards humanity (Study 3). Overall, these results shed light on why previous 
research might have yielded inconsistent results pertaining to the link between self-evaluation 
and conspiracy beliefs (Abalkina-Paap et al., 1999; Crocker et al., 1999; Stieger et al., 2013; 
Swami, 2012). The current findings challenge the assumption that conspiracy theories are 
endorsed only by those who lack confidence (Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Goertzel, 1994). 
Rather, our results suggest that conspiracy beliefs might be associated with self-promotional 
personality characteristics, such as individual narcissism. 
Of course, as our studies were correlational, they do not allow us to establish causal 
relationships between the variables. There are reasons to believe that narcissism and self-
esteem are basic personality predispositions predicting the more malleable conspiracy beliefs 
and we hope that the current research offers at least preliminary indication of the 
psychological mechanism that drives these connections. Nevertheless, it is also possible that 
these predispositions affect each other in a dynamic system (Cunningham, Nezlek, & Banaji, 
2004). Further research would do well to examine the causal pathways of the proposed 
mediation model as well as to investigate the consequences exposure to conspiracy theories 
might have for the individual self-concept.  
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